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1.  Introduction 
 
Rapidly growing water demands in the agriculture, industry, and household sectors have led 
to increasing concerns about a ‘Global Water Crisis’.  The main drivers for increasing water 
demands are growing populations, increasing urbanization, and economic growth, as well 
as—at higher income levels—calls for increased water allocations to maintain water-based 
ecosystems.  In addition, national-level and global policies and investments, either directly 
targeting water, or those that affect water availability indirectly, such as agricultural subsidy 
policies  or  foreign  direct  investments  in  the  industrial  sector  have  often  contributed  to 
growing demand and reduced supply of water. In the longer term, climate change will be a 
significant competitor for scarce water resources. 
 
While the demand for irrigation continues to increase in many regions, demand for municipal 
and industrial uses is increasing many times faster.  When water uses approach or exceed 
renewable supplies or developing new water resources becomes increasingly expensive, an 
increasingly  common  response  to  water  shortages  has  been  reallocation  of  water  from 
irrigated  agriculture—by  far  the  largest  water  user—to  non-agricultural  water  uses, 
principally  in  urban  areas.  Such  reallocations  pose  potentially  adverse  consequences  for 
equity, environmental sustainability, and the livelihoods of the rural poor.   
 
Water reallocation is often an implicit process, driven by investments in urban water supply 
systems,  and  industrial  zones.   But  several  explicit reallocation and transfer schemes are 
being developed, including the multi-billion mega-projects of the South-to-North Transfer in 
China  and  India’s  National  River-Linking  Project  (NRLP),  which  are  discussed  in  detail 
elsewhere in this report.  These transfers provide water for many uses, but meeting the needs 
of key urban and industrial uses is often a strong underlying objective.   
 
Some economic studies suggest that the negative local impacts of properly managed water 
transfers from agriculture will be minimal, but popular perceptions and some cases give a 
more pessimistic view.  In aggregate percentage terms, the volumes of water needed for other 
sectors  are  usually  small  relative  to  agricultural  water  use,  leading  to  arguments  that 
efficiency gains in agriculture could free up this water.  But in many cases the transfers are 
not spread evenly over the various agricultural water uses—they are concentrated in certain 
areas,  and  in  certain  (usually  dry)  seasons  and  years.    Whereas  much  irrigation  use  is  





























seasonal,  non-agricultural  requirements are  year-round,  necessitating  storage.  Transferring 
even seemingly small amounts of water out of agriculture can have impacts on a wide range 
of  stakeholders,  particularly  if  effective  institutions  to  manage  water  transfers  are  not  in 
place.  
 
Comprehensive reforms are required at each level of the water allocation process to allow 
transfers of water out of agriculture while sustaining crop yields and output growth to meet 
rising food demands.  The following sections describe trends and expected future changes in 
sectoral  water  demand,  which  drive  water  transfers;  describe  the  phenomenon  of  water 
transfers out of agriculture; as well as selected reallocation case studies; list implications for 
rural livelihoods and the environment; and describe alternative policies and institutions that 
can help mitigate or reverse adverse consequences for the poor. 
 
 
2.  Changes in Sectoral Water Demand 
 
By 2025, global population is expected to increase to 7.9 billion, more than 80 percent of 
whom will live in developing countries and 58 percent in rapidly growing urban areas.  In 
response to population growth and rising incomes, worldwide cereal demand will grow by a 
projected 46 percent between 1995 and 2025, and in developing countries by 65 percent 
(Rosegrant, Cai and Cline 2002). Half of the future growth in cereal production is expected to 
be met from irrigated agriculture. Moreover, more affluent diets will translate into greater 
demand for other water-intensive crops, such as sugarcane and horticultural crops.  
 
While irrigation accounted for approximately 86 percent of global water consumption in the 
mid-1990s, this share is expected to decline to 76 percent by 2025, given the rapid increases 
in non-irrigation demands, albeit from a low base. While water consumption for irrigation is 
expected to increase from 1,436 cubic kilometers in 1995 to 1,492 cubic kilometers by 2025, 
non-irrigation  demands  will  grow  much  faster,  from  363  cubic  kilometers  to  588  cubic 
kilometers during the same time frame (Rosegrant, Cai and Cline 2002). Changes will occur 
at a faster pace in the group of developing countries (see also Figure 1).  
 

















Source: Based on Rosegrant, Cai and Cline (2002).  
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At the same time, irrigation development remains critical for food security in many regions of 
the world. Today’s 250 million hectares of irrigated area is nearly five times the amount that 
existed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Without irrigation, the rapid increases in 
agricultural yields and outputs that we have seen over the last three decades could not have 
been  achieved.  While  irrigation  is  often  associated  with  adverse  environmental  and 
sometimes also social impacts, it remains one of the most critical inputs into farming, and 
therefore can be an important poverty reduction tool, a crucial contributor to affordable food 
prices,  and  through  its  significant  multiplier  effects,  improves  many  other  livelihood 
outcomes, such as health and nutrition (Lipton, Litchfield, and Faurès 2003; Rosegrant, Cai 
and Cline 2002).  
 
Moreover,  irrigation  systems  often  serve  many  other  rural  water  uses,  including  rural 
domestic  water  supplies,  household  gardens,  livestock,  fishing,  recreation,  and  other 
enterprises (Bakker et al. 1999).  Although these are often high-value water uses, it is often 
women or marginalized social groups (e.g. pastoralists or fishers) who depend on these other 
water uses, and they often have even more difficulty than farmers in defending their water 
use against demands from more powerful cities and industries.   
 
3.  Response to Changes in Demand: Alternative Mechanisms to Implement Water 
Reallocation 
 
Throughout  history,  the  most  common  response  to  growing  water  demands  has  been  to 
develop new supplies.  But by the end of the twentieth century, most of the easily-exploited 
water resources have been tapped, and increasing water supplies carries increasing financial 
and ecological costs.  Because irrigation is the largest water user, and because returns to 
irrigation per unit water use are generally low compared to other sectors, reallocating water 
from irrigation to other uses that have either higher economic returns (e.g. industry) per unit 
water, or  greater  political pressure (e.g.  urban domestic use)  has become  more  common. 
Although  generally  seen  as  reallocation  from  irrigation,  these  water  transfers  can  have 
profound effects on other rural water uses.   
 
Water transfers take place through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms, including 
administrative reallocation, market-based transfers, and negotiations with communities.  The 
nature of the transfer process has important implications for the degree to which third-party 
effects are considered, the types of compensation provided, and the public response to water 
transfers.    
 
Administrative reallocation 
Administrative reallocation often occurs from large bodies of water such as rivers, lakes, 
reservoirs, and large irrigation systems managed by state agencies. The inherent assumption 
is that water is public property.  The state justifies its rights to regulate and reallocate water 
for the benefit of the ‘wider public’, but often focuses on the more powerful sections of 
society – municipalities and factories. Formal hearings are rarely held, although farmers may 
protest the transfers through their politicians or other forms of agitation, as they successfully 
did in the Bhavani basin (see below).  In these cases, indirect compensation may be given, 
but users’ prior rights are rarely recognized, even for irrigated farmers, much less for other 
rural water users (for example, see Dixit 1997).  
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The  ‘invisibility’  of  other  rural  water  uses,  such  as  fish  production,  livestock  watering, 
homestead gardens, domestic use, and rural enterprises, at least from the perspective of the 
state and municipal  and industrial users, can  lead to  serious  livelihood  consequences  for 
women and other marginal groups when water is transferred out of agriculture.  
 
Because  both  state  and  customary  law  generally  accord  high  priority  to  drinking  water, 
farmers  often  accept  transfers  of  water  for  domestic  use,  particularly  if  the  transfer  is 
perceived as fair.  If farm households perceive that municipalities will be receiving a higher 
level of water service than is available to their rural areas, however, there are often protests, 
either through appeals to government or even through sabotage of the pipes transferring water 
(Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004).   
 
Administrative reallocation for industrial use is generally less acceptable to people who lose 
water  access, than transfers for domestic use.   However, in  that  case,  it  is  often  not the 
depletion of water quantity that results in protests, but reduction of water quality due to 
effluents that factories discharge back into waterways. 
 
Market-based reallocation 
There is increasing use of formal and informal market mechanisms through which water is 
either sold directly to buyers for non-agricultural uses or land is leased or sold to individuals 
or factories, who then either abstract groundwater beneath the land or use the share of water 
allotted  to  the  land  from  irrigation  systems.    The  operation  of  water  markets  with 
compensation for those who give up water presupposes fairly strong recognition of private 
water rights.    
 
The western United States and Chile have both used a variety of market or semi-market 
mechanisms in which individual farmers lease their water use rights to other users or sell 
their rights permanently (Easter, Rosegrant and Dinar 1998; Rosegrant and Ringler 1999:22).  
State recognition of private water rights, and especially water rights that are separable from 
land, have facilitated such market transfers, and state regulation of these transfers (Scott and 
Coustalin 1995; Easter, Rosegrant and Dinar 1998). Market transfers directly compensate 
those who engage in the transfers, but generally do not take into account the water claims of 
others who may be affected, unless there is specific state regulation. 
 
Collective negotiation 
Collective negotiation for water reallocation can be either between existing water users and 
the state or between the old and new users themselves.   Negotiated approaches can expand 
the range of options, for example, by seeking “win-win” solutions (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 
2000).  For example, in California some municipalities have secured additional water for 
drought years by paying farmers to either install water conservation devices or to increase 
groundwater recharge in wet  years,  with the city receiving the  additional water saved or 
stored (Howitt 1998).  A tankers’ association supplying middle class residents in Kathmandu 
have negotiated with a Village Development Committee (VDC) to purchase water from a 
stream near the community (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004).  But unlike water purchases from 
individuals, in this case the funds go to the VDC for investment in other community assets.   
 
In negotiated reallocation of water it is possible in theory that the rights of non-irrigation 
rural uses of water, for example, for livestock feeding, fisheries, kitchen gardens, etc. are 
taken into consideration. However rights and uses for non-irrigation rural uses are typically  
  6 
“invisible”  to  the  state,  market,  and  irrigators  and  thus  they  are  hardly  ever  taken  into 
consideration during negotiation.  
 
Other means of water transfer 
While it is useful to construct ideal types of administrative, market, and negotiated transfers, 
many  empirical  cases  involve  a  combination  of  these  reallocation  processes.  Moreover, 
illegal means, such as stealing water from canals or extracting water from groundwater are 
also common (as illustrated by Kurnia, Avianto, and Bruns 2000 for West Java).  Some of the 
means rely not on any type of law to justify them, but rather on force or stealth.  In the 
following sections we examine empirical cases of water transfers, and their impacts.   
 
4.  Case Studies on Water Reallocation 
Western United States 
The  western  United  States  is  perhaps  the  best-known  region  for  water  transfers  from 
agriculture to municipal/industrial as well as environmental uses.  Transfers have generally 
been arranged through a variety of market or quasi- market mechanisms in which individual 
farmers have opted to sell or lease their water use rights to other users.  Such transfers have 
been facilitated by the predominance of prior appropriation water rights, which are separable 
from the land, and because in allocating priority of rights, the state has generally established 
the nature of the water  flows and the volume or shares of the individuals’ rights (Howe 
1998).   
 
There  are  important  differences  in  the  nature,  and  hence  the  outcomes,  of  intersectoral 
transfers  in  the  different  states  of  the  western  US.    Arizona  and  Utah  conduct  transfers 
through  the  State  Engineers’  office,  which  determines  technical  characteristics  of  all 
proposed transfers and conducts hearings on third party effects.  Colorado uses water courts, 
which have much higher transaction costs for both those who propose the transfer and those 
who might want to protest it.  As a result, Howe (1998) reports that small water users with 
legitimate protests are often excluded.  Furthermore, only “beneficial use” rights, and not 
public uses, are considered.  Therefore, there is little recourse for those who are affected by 
the transfers through reduced return flows, reduced recreational or environmental water uses, 
or loss of livelihoods and hence the tax base in agricultural areas as they go out of irrigated 
production.  The result has been a popular backlash against intersectoral water transfers, and 
attempts to block interbasin transfers in the state legislature.   
 
New  Mexico’s  system  for water transfers through the State  Engineers’ office pays more 
attention to the rights of small water users, as well as third party effects.  Nevertheless, small 
farmers from acequias (traditional farmer-managed irrigation systems) may have difficulty in 
defending  their  rights,  even  though  they  are  the  most  senior  rights  in  the  state.    These 
farmers, who are generally of Hispanic descent, are socially marginalized because they have 
generally  less  education  and  are  often  not  fluent  in  English,  the  language  of  the  legal 
documents and hearings.  The involvement of a public interest law firm has been instrumental 
in promoting legal literacy regarding acequia water rights and transfer procedures, as well as 
representing the acequia owners and promoting measures to ensure greater participation by 
the acequia members (NNMLS 2000) 
 
Since 1991 transfers in California have been conducted through a State drought water bank, 
which arranges purchases from individual farmers for transfer to other users.  Most transfers 
have been temporary leases of water rights, rather than permanent transfers, in part because 
of the restrictions on water rights, but also because agriculture is economically strong in  
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California, and most holders of water rights do not want to permanently give up their water 
(Howitt 1998).  In some cases, municipalities have secured additional water for drought years 
by paying farmers to either install water conservation devices or to increase groundwater 
recharge in wet years, with the city receiving the additional water saved or stored.  
 
The impacts of water transfers from agriculture to other sectors in the US has been mostly 
evaluated  from  an  economic  perspective,  with  some  attention  to  broader  livelihood  and 
community outcomes.  For example, Howitt (1999) estimates “gains from trade” in California 
in terms of increases in the dollar value of output per unit water, as well as employment in 
rural and urban areas.  Even with payment for water sales, the water-exporting regions lost 
more in crop production than was paid for the water, but the gains in water-importing regions 
created a net gain for the state as a whole.  The same pattern applies for employment: the 
increases in jobs in water importing areas were estimated at 2.3 times the job losses in water-
exporting areas.  However, he notes that the “job multipliers” for urban use as a whole is 
much less than for industry alone, because a considerable portion of municipal water is used 
for landscaping.   
 
The distribution of gains and losses is not only between importing and exporting regions, but 
also within the exporting area.  In one community in Mendota, California, Villarejo (1997) 
found the number of farms fell by 26 percent, but small farms declined by 70 percent, labor 
demand decreased even more rapidly than cropland, and 3 of 7 wholesale produce firms went 
out of business when water was reallocated from agriculture to urban use during 1987-92.  
However, in some cases water transfers do not cause much loss of agricultural income or 
employment, especially where water was not used efficiently in agriculture, or where shifts to 
new technologies or higher-value crops allow farmers to produce more with less water.  In 
the  suburbs  of  Beijing,  for  example,  new  irrigation  technology  and  crop  diversification 
supported increases in grain and overall agricultural output values at the same time that water 
was diverted to the urban core and the overall irrigated area had declined (Nickum, 1997). 
 
For the case of Colorado, Howe (1998) discusses some broader impacts of water transfers.  
As water rights are sold and land goes out of agricultural production, not only  are local 
agricultural service businesses affected, but property values also go down.  This affects the 
rural tax base, and hence public services, including schools.  Even the loss of recreational 
uses and aesthetic values can have significant impact on employment, land values, and tax 
revenues, where tourism is a significant industry in rural areas.  These effects are larger in 
areas  where  water  rights  are  sold,  compared  to  where  rights  are  leased  or  traded  on  a 
temporary basis, like in California.   
 
Losses of income, employment, land values, and tax revenues can all be quantified (though 
with difficulty,  especially  in the  case of  employment  multipliers),  and  compensated with 
monetary or other economic measures.  What is harder to measure, much less compensate 
for, is loss of social and cultural values.  In New Mexico, members of one acequia (small-
scale irrigation system)  filed a  court  case  to block  water  transfers  to a ski resort on the 
grounds that they would disrupt the cultural core of the acequia community, which was built 
around mutual cooperation to maintain the acequia.  This case won an injunction blocking the 
sale of water but the case was overturned in the Appeals Court (Howe 1998).   
 
Asia   
While water transfers have received greatest attention in the west, they are occurring at an 
increasingly  rapid  rate  through  much  of  Asia,  from  China  to  Viet  Nam,  the  Philippines,  
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Indonesia, and South Asia.  Neither the water reallocation mechanisms nor the studies of their 
impacts  have  been  well  established  in  that  region.    The  diversity  of  water  rights  and 
livelihood strategies within communities is a source of further complexity in this region.  
 
In the Philippines, the Angat-Maasim river system serves both an irrigation system of over 
20,000 ha and the burgeoning  municipal and  industrial water demands  of Metro  Manila.  
State-recognized  water  rights  from  the  reservoirs  are  held  by  three  different  government 
agencies, representing different sectoral water uses: the National Irrigation Administration 
(NIA), the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), and the National Power 
Corporation (NPC).  NIA has the most senior water rights, but it is the agency that holds the 
rights to water in the reservoir, not the farmers, and the water code has emergency provisions 
giving priority to domestic use.  On average there is sufficient water for all users to date, but 
during droughts there are definite episodes of severe water shortages where agriculture loses 
out heavily to municipal and especially industrial use. For example, during the 1997 El Niño, 
agriculture received no water for the dry-season crop, while industry' s allocation fell only 
slightly. Although these may be short-term or annual fluctuations, the lack of water for an 
entire irrigation system has serious repercussions for food production and rural livelihoods, as 
well as for the irrigation agency’s income.  In addition to the irrigation system losing 125 
metric tons of rice production and the crop’s income, those renting land still had to pay their 
rent,  and  hence  went  into  debt  or  lost  their  land  (IRRI  2000).    The  National  Irrigation 
Authority (NIA) is itself a stakeholder that is negatively affected by these transfers, because 
the  agency  is  dependent  on  irrigation  service  fees  for  its  budget.  Because  the  irrigation 
system  is  a  government  system  and  farmers  only  had  weak  water  use  rights,  no  formal 
compensation was provided, although there were some government employment programs to 
help  offset  agricultural  losses,  and  there  was  a  suggestion  (not  implemented)  that  the 
government would compensate NIA for their budgetary shortfall.   
 
Increasing competition over water between irrigation, industry, and suburban developers in 
Indonesia has led to a variety of transfer mechanisms.  Kurnia, Avianto, and Bruns (2000) 
show how textile factories in West Java have obtained water through government-allocated 
permits drawing on surface irrigation water or groundwater, through negotiation with local 
farmers to buy or rent their land or acquire individual irrigation turns, and by adding extra 
inlets, putting pumps on the pipes to draw more water than normally allowed, or taking water 
out of turns.  The first mechanism, through administrative allocation, is sanctioned by state 
law.  Buying or renting land and taking the water allotted to the land is not sanctioned in state 
law, but local law generally accepts it as a legitimate means of acquiring water.  That is, 
although the water is not supposed to be separable from the land, farmers in the system 
acknowledge that the owners of fields have a right to a certain turn of water, and that this 
amount of water could be used even for non- agricultural purposes.  However, the additional 
inlets, pumps on pipes, and taking water out of turn are not sanctioned by state or local law, 
but continue by virtue of the power of the factories.  Factories also negotiated with upstream 
farmers and provided them with benefits (e.g. help in rebuilding a drainage structure) so that 
the farmers would not object to the extra water that factories take, while the downstream 
farmers got less water.  This approach compensates some farmers, but not those who bear the 
greatest costs; as a consequence of lost production and increased insecurity of supply, many 
farmers have  been forced to sell their land.    Although the farmers in this case  have the 
strongest water rights in both local and state law, they are generally not able to defend those 
rights because of the greater economic and political power of the factory owners.   
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India also has increasing cases of water being transferred from agriculture to industrial and 
municipal use, mostly through administrative reallocation, but negotiations, informal market 
transactions, and illegal means can also be found.  The Bhavani River serves over 100,000 ha 
in irrigation systems that date back to the 14th to 17th century and is the main source of water 
for the city of Coimbatore, with approximately 1.5 million people, as well as hundreds of 
villages in the area.  There are numerous industries in the area, especially water-intensive 
textile  industries,  both  in  the  city  and  dispersed  in  rural  areas.    Growing  demand  for 
municipal and industrial water uses has been met by a series of administrative reallocations 
since 1960. Informal groundwater markets have also developed, with farmers selling water to 
industries,  businesses,  and  urban  consumers.  Palanisami  (1994)  found  that  the  returns  to 
farmers from these sales are significantly higher than returns to farming, but unsustainable 
withdrawals of groundwater have resulted in a significant lowering of the water table, up to 
230 meters.  Thus even though farmers participating in the informal groundwater market may 
benefit from these water transfers, there is environmental damage, and surrounding farmers 
and others in the community are negatively affected.  
 
The water transfers led to a fall of almost 50 percent in farm income in the tail end of the 
system,  but  many  farmers  diversified  their  household  activities  to  reduce  dependence  on 
(mostly) rice farming.  There was an increase in poverty among farm households (from 3 to 
15  percent).    Hardest  hit  were  the  landless  agricultural  laborer  households,  who  lost 
employment and had poverty rates increase from 15 to 34 percent (Palanisami and Malaisami 
2004). 
 
Competition over water is not on quantity alone; water quality issues are gaining prominence 
in the area.  A sugar factory located in the basin also withdraws and returns large volumes of 
water, and local demands for treatment of the sugar factory effluent are gaining momentum.  
A viscose (organic liquid used to make rayon and cellophane) factory has also let effluents 
into the Bhavani River.   
 
In  addition  to  protests  from  the  farmers’  association,  a  civil  society  movement  has 
campaigned on a number of environmental issues, particularly related to water quality.  After 
a number of civic protests (with thousands of people) and court cases over the pollution, the 
Viscose plant was closed for failing to treat effluent.  This was a major event, leading to the 
loss of over 2,000 jobs, but also to an increase of fish production from 1036 mt in 1995-96 to 
1368 mt in 1999-2000.  The gains in fisheries production does not, in narrow  economic 
terms, offset the loss of income and employment from the factory, but as an indicator of 
ecosystem health and its overall impact on people and nature, it is a very positive sign.   
 
5.  Implications for Rural Livelihoods and the Environment  
 
At the macroeconomic level, water transfers out of agriculture contribute to growing water 
shortages and declining reliability of irrigation water supplies. According to Rosegrant, Cai 
and Cline (2002) over the next two decades reliability will decline globally, but shortages 
will be particularly severe in water-scarce basins, including the Indus in India, the Haihe and 
Yellow river basins in northern China, basins in northwestern China, Egypt, West Asia, and 
North Africa, and important U.S. food producing basins including the Colorado, Rio Grande, 
and Texas Gulf basins (Rosegrant, Cai and Cline 2002). Moreover, scarcity fueled through 
transfers  not  only  limit  area  expansion  but  also  slow  crop  yield  growth.  Poor  countries 
relying on irrigation will be particularly hit by declines in food production resulting from 
growing water transfers out of agriculture.   
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If badly managed, transfers can result in sharp price increases of staple cereals in global food 
markets, resulting in broadly negative impacts on low-income developing countries and the 
poor consumers in these countries.  
 
At the local level, farmer interests and impacts from transfers out of agriculture can vary 
substantially. A few, especially the larger farmers, may benefit substantially by selling water 
or because of the increase in the value of land (if employment stays local).  Landless and 
marginal farmers may also benefit if they can find work in the newly set up factories.  As 
rural households diversify their livelihood strategies to include more non-farm activities and 
migration to towns, interests in water for different uses become more complex.  Reviewing 
the evidence on regional impacts of water transfers, Rosegrant and Ringler (1998:22), based 
on Howe et al. (1990) report that:  
 
the severity of economic impacts on the area of origin will differ according to 
(a) whether or not the destination of transferred water remains within the same 
area of economic activity; (b) whether or not transfer proceeds are reinvested 
in the area of origin; (c) the economic vitality of the area of origin; and (d) the 
strength of backward and forward linkages of the irrigated agricultural sector. 
 
The extent to which local residents accept water transfers as legitimate may depend, in part, 
on the extent to which they share in the benefits from new uses.  Where local profits or 
employment  are  substantial,  transfers  are  perceived  to  be  fair,  or  where  agricultural 
production is not significantly impacted, there is likely to be less opposition.  However, if the 
municipal and industrial uses generate pollution, then farmers and rural dwellers often resort 
to protests. 
 
In both the West Java and Bhavani cases discussed above, increasing industrial water use has 
had serious negative impacts on agricultural production and fishing, because of greater water 
scarcity and because of pollution and temperature increases due to factory discharges.  While 
employment increased locally, most jobs went to non-local people.  The Indonesian case 
differs from outcomes reported in the US in one important respect: agricultural land values 
increased  with  industrial  development,  rather  than  decreased  because  the  industrial 
development was in the same rural area, so that the employment and incomes  generated 
stayed locally.  
 
In the Bhavani case, farmers and other environmental activists have protested the industrial 
water  use,  even  filing  court  cases  petitioning  that  the  factories  be  closed  down  for  not 
meeting  pollution  control  standards.    But  as  in  Indonesia,  the  employment  and  export 
revenues  generated  by  factories  was  a  key  factor  in  their  political  power.    The  state 
government agencies in the Bhavani area attempt to strike a balance between the demands of 
the farmers’ and factory owners’ lobby, both of which carry considerable political weight 
(Saravanan and Appasamy 1999).   
 
The  duration  of  transfers  also  affects  their  impact.    Where  water  is  leased  rather  than 
transferred permanently, there is an income stream that comes in each year, rather than a one-
time lump sum payment.  This is likely to be less damaging to rural economies overall.     
 
Consideration of the impact of third parties who are affected by the transfers is also critical.  
Water transfers in the western United States have given some attention to third party effects.   
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The process of transfer through the State Engineers’ Office appears to give more weight to 
the impact on others who might be adversely affected by the transfers, and is somewhat easier 
for small farmers and other interests to have a voice, compared to other transfer mechanisms, 
especially those involving water courts.  However, many developing countries have not yet 
developed such mechanisms to consider or redress negative impacts on the welfare of other 
rural residents, or the broader environment.   
 
6.  Institutions for Reallocation that Reduce Adverse Consequences for the Poor 
 
In the past, supply augmentation of water through new water development has been common 
to address water shortages. In maturing water economies, characterized by increasing scarcity 
values for water (Randall 1981), but also growing transfers of water (in scale and number), 
however, demand management increases in importance.  The task of demand management is 
to generate both physical savings of water and economic savings by increasing output per 
unit of evaporative loss of water, by reducing water pollution, and reducing non-beneficial 
water uses.  This can be supported through a variety of policy measures, including economic 
incentives  to  conserve  water  use,  e.g.  pricing  reform  and  reduced  subsidies,  but  also 
complementary regulations on water use rights, and policies targeting poor and vulnerable 
groups,  education  campaigns,  leak  detection,  retrofitting,  recycling,  and  other  technical 
improvements, enhanced pollution monitoring, and quota and license systems.  And while 
many  demand  management  measures  have  targeted  irrigation,  as  the  largest  water  user, 
municipal  and  industrial  water  use  cannot  grow  unchecked;  regulation  and  economic 
incentives are needed to reduce the negative ecological, economic, and social impacts of 
these uses, especially on water quality. 
 
Other supporting policies include an enhanced enabling environment for both the irrigated 
agriculture sector and the general economy to operate.  Measures here include introduction or 
improvement of market mechanisms and reduction of distortions in the food, industry, and 
trade sectors, combined with targeted interventions for the poor. This strategy should also 
facilitate internalization of adverse environmental impacts of water transfers. 
 
At  the  micro  level,  case-specific  interlinkages  between  urban  and  rural  sectors  and  the 
importance of local and basin-level characteristics make it difficult to generalize about better 
reallocation institutions.  However, key mitigation institutions include (1) the establishment 
of  secure  rights  to  water  that  are  monitored  and  enforced  by  adequate  institutions  and 
organizations;  (2)  transfers  of  relatively  small  amounts  from  many  irrigators,  inducing 
conservation measures instead of plot abandonment; (3) adequate compensation of sellers and 
affected third parties; and (4) reinvestment of gains-from-trade in the rural communities.   
 
Tools  need  to  be  combined  and  tailored  to  specific  situations,  but  typically  include 
decentralization of water management functions to appropriate levels; the use of incentives 
including pricing reform; enforcement of pollution control, and markets in tradable property 
rights; the introduction of appropriate water-saving technologies; and informal water leasing 
or sharing as well as formal markets in tradable water rights established in a participatory and 
rational manner.  
 
The Bhavani case study illustrates how conflicts have arisen in part because of the lack of 
consultation or negotiation over water transfers.  The result has been a number of protests and 
court  cases.    Water  quality  has  also  become  a  critical  issue,  but  perhaps  too  late.    One 
wonders if the closure of the viscose factory and the loss of thousands of jobs might have  
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been  prevented  if  the  water  transfers  had  been  publicly  discussed,  and  more  careful 
enforcement of effluent treatment requirements had been maintained from the beginning.  It 
appears that serious enforcement of these standards is now increasing the costs of industries, 
and decreasing further demand for industrial water allocations.  
 
While improving  irrigation  water  use efficiency is shown to  be  an effective  measure  for 
increasing water productivity, there is little room for such measures in some of the basins 
with greater  water  scarcity.  In these areas,  food  production  and farm  incomes could  fall 
significantly  if  water  for  irrigation  is  transferred  to  other  uses.  To  mitigate  the  negative 
impact  of  water  transfers  here,  investments  in  new  agricultural  technologies  and 
diversification into alternative crop management practices, including the diversification of 
farming into less water-intensive crops, and measures to support the eventual reduction of the 
economic  role  of  agriculture  will  be  important.  Renewed  investments  in  new  irrigation 
systems in areas that can support further water withdrawals and food production growth will 
be necessary to compensate declines in severely water-scarce basins.  
 
Although economic factors certainly play a major role in shaping water transfers, it would be 
naïve to ignore the broader political economy: as the case studies indicate, powerful groups 
are  most  likely  to  obtain  water  at  the  expense  of  less  powerful  users.    Rural  domestic, 
livestock,  fishing,  and  environmental  uses  are  often  overlooked  in  the  process.    Special 
measures are needed to ensure that these users, as well as environmental uses, have a voice in 
any water transfers.   
 
Because water is such an essential resource for lives and livelihoods, forced expropriation of 
water  from  farmers  and  rural  areas  is  likely  to  lead  to  protests.    Institutional  and  legal 
environment  reforms  must  empower  water  users  to  make  their  own  decisions  regarding 
resource use, while at the same time providing a structure that reveals the real scarcity value 
of water, and the full costs of pollution.  Voluntary transfers that provide compensation to 
those who give up water and to third parties that are affected are likely to be more acceptable 
than administrative reallocations that do not give voice to existing users’ concerns.  Failure to 
implement  these  reforms  could  significantly  slow  the  growth  in  crop  production  in 
developing countries and could have devastating impacts on the livelihoods of the rural poor. 
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